Bouaké / Back knew the bombing of the French camp, evidence of a conspiracy orchestrated

Read Marianne (French magazine) from Thursday, December 22, 2011

The call-Gbagbo Chirac that started it all

This says a confidential report of UNOCI

Eight (08) years after the attempted reconquest of northern Côte d'Ivoire by the Defence Forces and safety (MSDS) on the instructions of President Laurent Gbagbo, the French newspaper''''Mariane returns to this event broke the links between diet and the rebuilding of the Elysee. The paper gives some insights on this operation dubbed''dignity''.  

November 6, 2004, two Sukhoi 25 aircraft belonging to the Ivorian armed forces (FANCI) and piloted by mercenaries Belarusian bombard the French military camp in Bouaké Descartes high school killing nine French soldiers and one American civilian. Thirty-eight French soldiers are also injured in the attack. In Paris, we immediately acknowledge the Head of State Laurent Gbagbo, to be responsible for this criminal act. A decision by President Jacques Chirac is immediately transmitted by Michèle Alliot-Marie to Chief of Defence Staff, General Henri Bentegeat, allowing it to destroy the Ivorian air force. Soon after, two MI 24 and two Sukhoi 25 are rendered inoperative. Every reason to believe at this point that the French response is legitimate. Simply, there is a problem. Instead of looking for the perpetrators of the attack against the French soldiers to make them available to the court, the French authorities let them flee to Togo and outside Africa.

In the period before the bombing, the Ivory Coast is cut in half. The whole northern part of the country is under the control of rebel forces. The south, including Abidjan, is the only area under the authority of the government forces. In between, there is what is called "zone of confidence", placed under the control of the French army. Despite this serious problem of de facto partition of the country and illegal occupation of part of the territory by the rebels, "the international community", that is to say, essentially for the occasion the United States and France , press, however Laurent Gbagbo, whose mandate expires to organize presidential elections in 2005. (...) The Accra III Agreement of July 30, 2004, however, requires the rebels to disarm proceed no later than October 15 of that year. When the deadline arrived, the rebels are not blamed or punished for failure to comply with their commitments. Laurent Gbagbo has when he has no choice. The President chooses to militarily conquer the North became a stronghold of the rebel forces.

On November 2, 2004, Colonel Mangou who directs the operations of government forces in the field, informed a senior French of an imminent offensive against the rebels. On the same day, there is a deployment of 25 Sukhoi aircraft at the airport of Yamoussoukro. Just steps away, an Antonov 12 registered TU VMA to unload combat equipment. It performs several rotations between Abidjan and Yamoussoukro to deliver arms and ammunition to the soldiers of the Ivorian army. Then the ambassador of France in Ivory Coast, Mr. Gildas Le Lidec, and General of the Licorne force, Henri Poncet, decided to go to President Gbagbo to try to dissuade him from leading the offensive against the rebels. They turned down: the Ivorian Head of State does not intend to retreat. The next day, November 3rd to 11:15, shortly after the Council of Ministers in Paris, President Jacques Chirac, already informed, telephone directly to President Laurent Gbagbo to warn against the risk of serious incidents between FANCI and the Ivorian troops French Forces of the Unicorn.  

The phone "cut" between Chirac and Gbagbo

Dissatisfied with the firmness displayed by his counterpart Laurent Gbagbo, President Chirac raises his voice quickly forgetting that his interlocutor is attentive to both the form and content of his remarks. Suddenly, President Gbagbo, who listens for a while, interrupted and said that his decision to launch the offensive is already taken, he wanted simply to inform. He hangs up the handset. President Gbagbo said: "After this exchange with Jacques Chirac, we decided to lead the attack against the rebels before the effective date so that France can not act against our military initiative." Yet a few days before the offensive of the Ivorian army, the French officers were already aware, because of indiscretions Ivorian officers, preparations for the attack against the rebels (....)

On the morning of November 4, 2004, the offensive is launched against the rebels. It is focused on military objectives of the Armed Forces of the Forces Nouvelles (FAFN) located in the region of Bouaké. The next day the Ivorian offensive continues in the area of rebels. The Sukhoi 25 and MI 24 military pounded rebel positions. A confidential report of UNOCI dated November 9, 2004 said that the bombing of the Ivorian army reached military targets. According to sources close to UNOCI, "it was enough for an extra day of bombing of the Ivorian army and the rebels of the North would have been completely destroyed." This view was unacceptable to the Elysee. In this context of tension and political bias that occurs the attack against the French encampment November 6, 2004 in Bouake. Who gave the order to bomb the French camp in Bouake and for what purpose? According to information in our possession, President Laurent Gbagbo seems to have not even been informed of what would actually happen on that day (....) The bombing of the French camp was a deliberate act and strongly suggested the pilots mercenaries incriminate Mr. Gbagbo. In whose interest Laurent Gbagbo, who sought ways of healing with France, would he have pushed his soldiers to commit such an act against the French military?

It is obvious that even a poor NCO plagued by megalomania never intended to bomb a camp of French soldiers at that time. General Poncet, contrary to what he has advanced a time in the press knows who gave the order to fire on the Descartes high school in Bouake. Let us return to the sequence of events and it will be understood more the strange attitude of the French authorities. From November 2, 2004, when Sukhoi 25 arrive at the airport of Yamoussoukro, a detachment of the second search Hussars was ordered to monitor them. Two teams, taking turns each day will have their eyes on the tarmac. They note, film and all the details are likely to provide guidance on the actions of the Sukhoi 25. The French even managed to photograph the drivers of Sukhoi 25 and part of the crew. All these data are sent to the Office of Intelligence G2 PCIAT (Command Post Joint Theater) in Abidjan. The same information is also transmitted to the office of Chief of Defence Staff in Paris and the DGSE (General Directorate for External Security) and DRM (Directorate of Military Intelligence). No one can claim that the information is not available on the Sukhoi 25 and their staff.

When the attack is completed, the first decision that comes from Paris is the destruction of Sukhoi 25 and not a request for the arrest of the commando who just liquidate the French soldiers and wounding others. Moreover, the order of destruction of Ivorian Sukhoi has been variously appreciated in the Force Licorne. In the tension and confusion prevailing around the death of French soldiers in Bouake, some officers soon realized, to their amazement, that political power is not very interested in seeing an open investigation into the attack particularly brutal.  

How Paris has obstructed the investigation

The next day, November 7, General Poncet and his men arrested nine Ukrainian nationals, four Belarusian nationals and two Russian nationals. A total of fifteen suspects were immediately placed in detention in a shed by the French military. While a policeman of the Special Operations Command tent, with some soldiers, to question them to learn more about their potential liability in the bombing against the Descartes high school, an order from the Foreign Ministry demands the immediate release of Slavic mercenaries held by the French. "To seek the extradition of nationals, it would have an international warrant is issued. This was not the case. At the time, we had no evidence, for example, the pictures were not decisive. We had nothing to blame them, "said Minister of Defense Michele Alliot-Marie. His comments are bound and some military experts (...)

Claim that France needed a international arrest warrant for the arrest of suspects is not entirely accurate because the law of April 14, 2003 repressing the activity of mercenaries provided a unique opportunity to interview these people who, for some, involved in transporting ammunition to the Antonov 12 and others, links to the drivers of Sukhoi 25. In addition, he said there was nothing to blame them means at least that information accumulated by the military and the French intelligence services were of no interest, at which they had no connection with the bombing of Bouaké . On November 11, 2004, at the express request of the Ambassador of France, the French call without too snort, the fifteen Russian mercenaries to the consular authorities. After this episode particularly confusing, the French authorities are illustrated again leaving this time, the pilots of 25 Sukhoi escape. What happened? A few days after the bombing, the authors eclipsed smuggled to Togo, which borders the Ivory Coast.

During a traffic stop at the border of Ghana and Togo, they are arrested aboard a bus by the Togolese police (...) In the light of the Interior Minister of Togo, who notes the excitement of the French intelligence services to the announcement of the arrests, trying to understand why France is in no hurry to demand the extradition of suspects to Belarus that the French courts to make the light more quickly on this strange case. Seeing nothing ahead, the Togolese authorities to keep tire Belarusians in prison indefinitely. According to some observers, the behavior of the French authorities in this matter is more than disturbing. They are going to multiply indefinitely barriers to work for judges. This was confirmed by Judge Brigitte Raynaud who was responsible, from the beginning of the file (...)

The first person who does not show an honest determination to know the perpetrators and instigators of the attack on Descartes High School is the Minister Michele Alliot-Marie. Why is the Minister Michele Alliot-Marie, she left to escape the perpetrators of the bombing of Bouaké when they were arrested by the Togolese authorities and made ​​available to the French authorities? Why did she not facilitate the work of the French court when it was ready to pull the bottom of this? Why have you refused to do an autopsy on the body to help the military justice to expose any Gbagbo? Why have reversed the bodies of soldiers in coffins to the point of adding to the pain of the families, trauma unnecessary? Why will we not know who ordered the bombing of Bouaké? Why Elysée has never encouraged the declassification of all documents requested by the judges if there is nothing to fear from his side? Who the truth about this case raises a real problem?

Admittedly, it is certainly not the President Laurent Gbagbo. He told us: "We do not know the precise circumstances in which nine French were killed. The Ambassador of France to Côte d'Ivoire, Mr. Le Lidec phoned me to tell me that Belarusians were arrested in Abidjan by the French military. So I was very happy to know that they were under arrest, and especially that the truth would burst. We thought we were going to know why the French soldiers were killed and who had given orders to commit such an act. I finally learned that they had been released by the French and we never received any written record of the hearing or on elements of a preliminary investigation of their arrest in Ivory Coast. I later learned they had been arrested in Togo and the Interior Minister of Togo had heard. The latter would have tried unsuccessfully to reach the French Ministers of Defense and Interior to obtain the extradition of suspects Belarus. So far, we still do not know who killed the French soldiers and why they were killed. This means that one can make assumptions about this case. "